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Abstract 
The role of the State in the economy and in the social arena was deeply transformed in 
the second half of the 1970s, on account of the change of the political regime. The 
integration into the European Union since 1985 has brought new radical changes in that 
role. The paper describes the most important of those changes, putting a special 
emphasis on social policies and on the labour market, and on the challenges that have to 
be faced because of European Monetary Union. 
                                                
*Paper presented at the conference “From Isolation to Integration: Fifteen years of Spanish and 
Portuguese Membership in Europe,” Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard 
University, 2-3 November 2001.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Since Portugal became a member of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1985, the evolution of its 
labour market has presented significant differences in relation to the average of the European Union and to 
Spain: its unemployment rates have been lower; its wages have increased faster; and its labour regulations 
continued to be tighter. 
 
The contrasts between the Portuguese labour market experience and those of Spain and other European Union 
countries (EU-15) have puzzled many economists. Several analyses have been undertaken with the objective 
of trying to find explanations for such contrasts. But the conclusions reached have not always been 
sufficiently clear cut. 
 
The present paper describes the behaviour of the Portuguese unemployment and wages in the last two 
decades, and in particular since the accession to the EEC in 1985. It comments on the explanations that have 
been proposed in several studies for the differences in relation with Spain. And it emphasises the role of the 
government and central bank policies, especially as regards the management of domestic demand and the 
exchange rate. 
 
II. Unemployment 
 
In the four-year period 1974 to 1978, Portuguese unemployment rates rose from 1.7 percent to 7.9 percent. 
As in other European countries, this sudden increase was to a large extent explained by the adverse effects of 
the first oil price shock. But two other causes, specific to Portugal, had even more weight:  the troubles of the 
revolutionary period of 1974-75, after the change of political regime; and the influx of more than 700,000 
refugees from the former colonies of Angola and Mozambique. In such  conditions, in 1978 the Portuguese 
unemployment rate exceeded the average of Western Europe and was higher than that of Spain. 
 
However, since 1978 Portuguese unemployment ceased to increase  in contrast with what happened in most 
European countries and especially in Spain. As shown in Figure 1, it fluctuated in accordance with economic 
cycles, but it remained below the European average. During that period, Spain had always the highest 
unemployment rate in EU-15 and Portugal one of the lowest. The accession to the EEC in 1985 does not 
appear to have had a significant impact, either positive or  negative, in the Portuguese unemployment rates. 
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Figure 1 
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It has sometimes been argued that the Spanish statistics overstate true unemployment and that the Portuguese 
ones understate it. But careful comparisons and some specific tests suggest that the possible errors in 
statistical measurement were almost certainly not large enough to invalidate the wide differences in 
unemployment between Portugal and Spain.
1 
 
The following sections discuss possible causes for such differences that have been investigated by a certain 
number of authors. They will deal with the labour intensity of economic growth, the flexibility in the volume 
of employment and the behaviour of wages. The concluding section analyses the impact of the constraints 
imposed by the European Monetary Union on the unemployment outlook for forthcoming years. 
 
The levels of employment have also been influenced by the active labour policies of the government, but 
these are not examined in the present paper. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Blanchard (1999), p. 26.  
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3.  Labour intensity of economic growth 
 
One of the explanations for the contrast in the unemployment experiences of the two Iberian countries is 
based on the argument that economic growth has been more labour-intensive in Portugal than in Spain
2. 
 
According to that argument, Spain has implemented deep structural reforms in its industrial sector in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, while in Portugal few changes of that type were introduced. The Spanish reforms 
involved large cuts in the output of several industries and the destruction of many jobs. They resulted in a 
serious worsening of the employment situation, but it is suggested that they created the conditions for 
significant productivity improvements, for fast real wage increases and for gains in international 
competitiveness. This explanation points out, that, by contrast, Portugal maintained its traditional industries 
(textiles, clothing, shoes, etc) without significant restructuring and relied heavily on them to expand the GDP. 
According to such an interpretation, Portugal opted for a strategy of weak progress in productivity, of slowly 
increasing real wages and of the maintenance of the international competitiveness on the basis of low wages 
costs. 
 
This explanation is however based on statistical data which do not provide an adequate picture. The data 
covering a larger period, on which figures 4 and 5 are based tell a very different story: 
 
-  labour productivity increased in  Portugal as much as in Spain from 1975 to 1986, but it rose 
much more rapidly from 1986 to 2000; 
-  it is true that average wages in Portugal are substantially lower than in Spain (in correspondence 
with differences in productivity levels) and that, in real terms, they increased less than in Spain 
from 1977 to 1985. However their slow growth in real terms from 1977 to 1985 corresponds 
mainly to the gradual correction of the unsustainable wage explosion in Portugal that occurred 
during the revolutionary period of 1974-75. If the entire period from 1974 to 2000 is considered, 
the increases in real wages appear to be far higher in Portugal than in Spain. 
 
It can not therefore be said that the comparatively low unemployment levels of Portugal are due to weak 
improvements in labour productivity and to more stagnant wages, as compared with Spain and with the 
average of the EU-15 countries. 
 
                                                
2 Marimon (1996), pp. 24-25 and 79-85.  
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A more plausible explanation can be found by looking at the statistical data on employment and GDP. Figure 
2 suggests that the satisfactory experience of Portugal in the area of unemployment results to a large extent 
from faster economic growth that in Spain and the EU-15 during most of the years of the last quarter of the 
twentieth century. It has also been due to slower increases in the labour force than in Spain, except during the 
second half of the 1970s (Figure 6). 
 
On the basis of the information provided by Figures 3 to 5, it can not be said that Spain had a bad unem-
ployment record because its economic growth has been based on high productivity increases rather than in 
jobs creation or because its labour-costs have risen too much. The key explanation seems to be that the Span-
ish labour force has increased very fast since the beginning of the 1980s and that, with the comparatively low 
rate of economic growth, it has been difficult for the labour demand to adapt quickly to such increase. 
 
I should, however, be pointed out that from 1993 to 2000, the unemployment situation in Spain improved 
considerably and that the differences of unemployment rates in relation to Portugal became much smaller, 
due to the dynamism in the creation of new jobs (but not in productivity increases). 
 
Figure 2: 
Portugal less Spain: Difference between Portugal and Spain 
Accumulated since 1974 
 
                              Source: European Commission (2000) 
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Figure 3 
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                              Source: European Commission (2000) 
 
 
Figure 4 
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                              Source: European Commission (2000) 
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Figure 5 
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                                Source: European Commission (2000) 
 
 
Figure 6 
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4.  Unemployment and the rigidity of labour regulations 
 
Many of the analysis for the persistence of high unemployment levels in the European Union conclude that 
the main explanations lie in the rigidity of labour regulations, especially those which seek to improve the 
employment protection for workers (EPL). On the basis of the argument that tight labour regulations increase 
the natural rate of unemployment, the flexibilization of such regulations has been one of the key 
recommendations of the "Jobs Strategy" of OECD. 
 
International comparisons published by OECD
3 show that, among its members, Portugal has been the country 
with strictest labour regulations, in particular as regards EPL (See Table 1). This is still the situation, at 
present, despite changes introduced in 1989, which made some of regulations slightly less restrictive (mainly 
by allowing dismissal on the grounds of lack of economic performance and of economic redundancy). In the 
1980s, Spain had, on average almost the same tightness in the labour regulations as Portugal, but in the 1990s 
it relaxed them. Now they seem to be more flexible than in several other European countries. 
 
In the OECD comparisons, the countries involved are ranked on the basis of the ascending order of the strict-
ness of a variety of aspects of the labour legislation. One of the more recent of such comparisons produced 
the results which are summarized in Table 1. 
 
The explanation of the coexistence in Portugal of rigid labour regulations with low unemployment rates has 
been a challenging problem to many labour-market analysts. If the tightness of labour regulations is con-
sidered a good explanation for high unemployment, it is difficult to understand why it applies to Spain but is 
not valid for Portugal. 
 
Several interpretations have been proposed for that puzzle. 
 
First, recent researches suggest that the effects of EPL on unemployment levels are weaker than is was as-
sumed before. Empirical studies published by the OECD
4 show that tight EPL regulations tend to affect certain 
groups of workers (such as, for instance, the new entrants into the labour market) and tend to increase self-
employment, but are not significantly correlated with unemployment levels. If these results are valid, the 
coexistence in Portugal of strict employment protection regulations (EPL) with low unemployment can be 
more easily accepted. 
 
                                                
3 OECD (1999) 
4 OECD (1999), p. 75-99  
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Table 1: 
Rankings in ascending order of the indicators of the strictness of EPL 
  Late 1980s  Late 1990s 
Types of Regulations  Number 
of 
countries 
covered 
Rank of 
Portugal 
Rank 
of 
Spain 
Number 
of 
countries 
covered 
Rank of 
Portugal 
Rank 
of 
Spain 
Employment protection for regular employment           
Regular procedural inconveniences  22  19  20.5  27  24.5  12 
Notice and severance pay for non-fault individual 
dismissals 
20 20  19 27 27  23 
Difficulty of dismissal  20  20  15  27  26.5  16 
Overall strictness against dismissals  20  20  19  27  27  18 
 
Regulations of temporary employment          
Fixed term contracts  19  11  8  27  19  21 
Temporary  work  agencies  24 15  20 26 23  24 
Overall strictness of regulations  19  12  13  26  21  22 
 
Regulations of collective dismissals          
Overall strictness relative to individual dismissals        27  20  13 
 
Overall Strictness of Employment Protection 
Legislation 
19 19*  17* 26  26**  22** 
Source: OECD (1999), pp. 57, 63 and 65. 
 
  *   Average of indicators for regular contracts and temporary contracts 
  **  Weighted average of indicators for regular contracts, temporary contracts 
       and collective contracts 
 
  NOTES:   Higher ranks represent higher strictness of the regulations. 
       When two countries have the same rank, the average of that rank 
       and the following integer is attributed to  both of them. Thus,  
       for instance if two countries have the rank of 26, the value 26.5 is 
       attributed to each of them. 
 
 
Second, the strictness of EPL is, to a large extent, evaded by the recourse to non-regular forms of work: fixed-
term contracts, self-employment, temporary work, underground work, etc. In recent years, regular work 
corresponded to only 60 percent of total employment in Portugal. The rest consisted of self-employment (26 
percent of the total), fixed term contracts (8 percent) and other forms of non-regular work (6 percent). 
 
Third, the measures of EPL provided in Table 1 are not entirely adequate. Small differences in the texts of the 
regulations of two countries, may result in widely divergent real effects: the specific institutional structures of 
each country may have a strong influence of the strictness of its regulations, when they are actually 
implemented. This is the reason why surveys based on employers' assessments of the restrictions which they  
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face in dismissing workers (Table 2) put Portugal and Spain in better relative situations than the comparisons 
of Table 1.  
 
Finally, non-compliance with labour regulations is also an important factor for reducing the effects of the 
rigidity of EPL. In Portugal, that non-compliance is mainly found among small- and medium-sized enter-
prises, but these account for a larger proportion of the total economic activity than in other EU-15 countries, 
except Greece. 
 
 
Table 2 
Assessments by employers of the strictness of 
employment protection regulations 
(Ranks in ascending order of restrictiveness) 
    
       International   EC  ad-hoc 
       Organization   surveys 
       of  Employers 
     
             1989         1989  1994 
 
Number of countries compared  14  10  10 
Rank of Portugal  7.5  10   4 
Rank of Spain  13   3   2 
 
Source:  OECD (1999), p.67 
 
 
In view of these explanations, it is not difficult to understand why the average labour market flexibility in 
Portugal appears to be higher than in Spain and other European countries, despite the high rigidity of the 
regulations shown in Table 1. This means that the Portuguese labour market has a dual structure: around half 
of the workers, especially those who have jobs in the public sector and in large enterprises, enjoy levels of 
employment protection that are among the highest in Europe; while the other half (including workers in small 
and medium sized enterprises, the self-employed and non-regular workers) receive little protection from the 
labour market regulations and provide a high flexibility to the labour market.  
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5.  Wages, inflation and unemployment 
 
Real wage flexibility is commonly considered as the most important explanation for the comparatively low 
employment in Portugal. It is argued that such flexibility has been much higher in Portugal than in Spain and 
in other EU countries. Consequently, in periods of economic slowdown and in face of shocks, unemployment 
has increased less in Portugal than in other economies.  
 
As already shown above (Figure 5), during the last two decades real average wages per worker have risen 
more in Portugal than either in Spain or in the whole of the European Union. The trend has however been 
irregular. 
 
The change in the Portuguese political regime in April 1974 was immediately followed by a wage explosion. 
During the revolutionary period of labour unrest of 1974-76, real wages shot up by around 40 percent. The 
excessive labour cost increases that were thus imposed on enterprises rendered the situation unsustainable for 
practically all of them and led to a serious crisis in the external competitiveness of economy. 
 
In order to restore the equilibrium, during the years 1977-79 the authorities imposed nominal wage ceilings, 
which were lower than expected inflation, and made substantial devaluations of the escudo, which 
contributed to the acceleration of inflation. During those three years, real wages fell by about 4 percent, 
despite rapidly rising labour productivity, and real unit labour costs were reduced by about 17 percent (See 
Figures 5 and 7). The equilibrium of the balance of payments was thus re-established. 
 
Figure 7 
REAL UNIT LABOUR COSTS (INDICES, 
1985=100)
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The cuts in real wages which occurred then corresponded to a correction of the excesses of 1974-75, but they 
were a first sign of flexibility of real wages in Portugal. They were tolerated by workers, without substantial 
problems of labour unrest, because of the menaces of rising unemployment. 
 
During the 1980s, Portuguese real wages increased less than productivity. Unit labour costs fell much more 
than the average of the EU-15 (Figure 7).  
 
With the objective of fighting inflation in 1989, the Portuguese authorities dismantled the crawling peg, and 
replaced it by a stable exchange rate, anchored to the currencies of the European Monetary System (EMS). As 
expected, the new exchange regime had an immediate impact on the behaviour of the prices of tradable 
goods, which began to follow closely those of the EMS countries. The inflationary expectations of workers 
and producers of non-tradable goods adjusted however at a much slower speed. The consequence was that 
from 1989 to 1993, nominal wages and the prices of non-tradables rose far more than those of tradable goods 
and than overall inflation. This is the reason for the sharp increases in real wages from 1989 to 1992, which 
can be seen in Figure 5. 
 
In the subsequent years, those increases were not reversed except temporarily in 1993, in consequence of the 
depreciation of the escudo, associated with the troubles of the EMS in 1993, and the rise of unemployment, 
caused by the cyclical depression of that year. In spite of rising real wages and the decline of inflation, 
unemployment after 1995 was not negatively affected; first, because productivity improvements offset a large 
proportion of the real wages increases; second, because of the effects of short run wage flexibility; and, third, 
because the rapid fall of interest rates and large increases in foreign borrowing allowed quite a good 
expansion of domestic demand. 
 
As shown in Figure 8, real wages tended to fall or to increase more slowly in years of strong devaluations of 
the nominal effective exchange rate of the escudo and in years of high and rising unemployment. 
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Figure 8 
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These relationships are confirmed by a linear regression covering the years from 1980 to 2000. That 
regression shows that changes in real wages were correlated positively with devaluations of the exchange rate 
and negatively with increases in the unemployment rate. The regression coefficients of the two independent 
variables have the expected signs and are significantly different from zero, the first at the 95 percent 
confidence level and the second  at the 90 percent (but not at the 95 percent) confidence level.
5  
 
The escudo was depreciated continuously, under a system of crawling peg, from 1977 to 1989. Many econ-
omists tend to express the view that the effects of currency depreciation on real unit labour costs are usually 
temporary, and will disappear after one or two years. This view does not seem to be borne out by the 
Portuguese experience. It can be see in Figure 8 that when the depreciation of the nominal effective exchange 
rate of the escudo was accelerated there were reductions or slower increases in real wages and that the 
consequent reductions in unit labour costs were not offset in the following years. What happened was that 
high rates of depreciation accelerated domestic inflation beyond the levels previously expected by economic 
                                                
5 The regression for the period 1980-2000 is 
  w = 2.75 + 0.20 E – 0.90 u-1  
      (t=5.53) (t=3.74) (t=1.90)    R
2 =0.55   F=10.9    d.f.=18 
 where 
  w = annual increases in real wages 
  e  = annual depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate 
 u -1 = increase in the unemployment rate in the preceding year.  
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agents and led in consequence to non-anticipated declines in real wages, which were not entirely reversed 
afterwards. 
The accumulated exchange rate depreciations of the exchange rate during the 1980s led thus to falling unit 
labour costs, which contributed to the creation of jobs and to avoid large increases in unemployment. 
 
The influence of changes in unemployment rates on the behaviour of real wages was almost as important as 
that of the exchange rate policy. That influence implies that real wage rigidity has been very low in Portugal. 
The same conclusion has been reached by means of more sophisticated analysis.
6 
 
Due to the higher flexibility of real wages, employment in Portugal was less affected by economic shocks  
(resulting for instance from shifts in prices, in demand, in the labour force, in productivity or in external 
competitiveness) than in Spain or in other European countries. 
 
There are three main explanations for the low rigidity of real wages in Portugal. First, inflation was high and 
variable from 1975 to the early 1990s and in several years  it generated large differences between the in-
flationary expectations of workers and other economic agents and the actual changes in the aggregate price 
level. Second, actual wages have exceed frequently the wages agreed in collective agreements; in periods of 
high or increasing unemployment, the excesses can be reduced quite easily and actual real wages may fall or 
increase less than contractual wages. And thirdly, there has been strong fears of the workers of loosing their 
jobs  when  unemployment is high or increasing. 
 
There are good indicators to justify the last of these reasons – the fear of workers of loosing their jobs. One of 
such indicators is the attachment of workers to their work-places, repeatedly found in enterprises in serious 
financial situations, even when their wages cease to be paid or begin to be paid with long delays. Often they 
continue to cling to their jobs, despite the weak prospects of recovering their wages in arrears. Another is the 
low degree of protection provided in the past by unemployment benefits.
7 Up 1985 to 1989, the eligibility 
criteria for unemployment benefits were so strict that less than 20 percent of the actual unemployment were 
covered. Subsequently those criteria were relaxed and the coverage rose to around 40 percent to 50 percent. 
In Spain the generosity of the system of unemployment benefits was much higher than in Portugal during the 
1980s but it was reduced in the 1990s
8 and the two countries are now in a more similar situation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
6 Castillo, Rolado and Jimeno (1997) 
7 Blanchard and Jimeno (1995). 
8 Bover, Garcia-Perea and Portugal (1998)  
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The weakness of the Portuguese system of unemployment subsidies as compared with that of Spain has been 
considered as a major explanation for the high real wage flexibility and for the low employment rates in the 
1990s. However, the contrast in the experiences of both countries became smaller during the 1990s. In Spain, 
the reductions of the generosity of unemployment benefits and the relaxation of the strict EPL were probably 
important factors in explaining why unemployment has been falling quickly since 1994. In Portugal, the more 
generous system of unemployment subsidies, combined with the maintenance of tight EPL, with lower 
inflation rates and with the stability of the exchange rate, may have resulted in a reduction of the real wage 
flexibility. The fact that Portuguese real wages increased from 1994 to 1996, despite unemployment rates 
around 7 percent, may be a sign of higher real wage rigidity than in the preceding decade, but so far the 
statistical data do not allow a robust conclusion (See Figure 8). In any case, even if we accept the hypothesis 
that real wage flexibility is now lower than in the 1980's, there are not yet any signs that unemployment was 
negatively affected by that change.  
 
 
6.  Wages and external competitiveness 
 
It was shown in the preceding section that in the 1980s the rapid growth of real wages in Portugal was, in 
comparative terms, compensated by high increases in labour productivity and that, in consequence, the be-
haviour of real unit labour costs expressed in the national currency was not much different from that of Spain 
or from the European average. Because of the fast real appreciation of the escudo from 1989 to 1992, the 
conclusion is however radically different when we look at the competitiveness of nominal labour costs 
expressed in euros. 
 
As already explained above, the stabilization of the exchange rate after 1989 was reflected only with a quite 
long delay in the slowing down of nominal wage increases. Consequently, Portuguese nominal wages 
denominated in euros, rose abruptly from 1989 to 1992. Since 1994, Portuguese inflation continued to exceed 
the European average, although by smaller margins than before. The increases of nominal wage in euros 
tended, therefore, to exceed those of Spain and of other EU-15 countries. And since the differences in such 
increases were larger than differences in productivity improvements, unit labour costs in euros at current 
prices rose far more in Portugal than in the EU-15 as a whole or in Spain (Figures 9 and 10). 
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Figure 9 
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Figure 10 
 
RELATIVE UNIT LABOUR COSTS IN EUROS 
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The outcome was a considerable deterioration in the competitiveness of the tradable goods produced in 
Portugal. 
 
A regression covering the period of 1977-2000 shows that the growth of the volume of imports was positively 
correlated with the growth of GDP and with unit labour costs denominated in euros relative to the average of  
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the EU-15.
9 The higher those relative unit labour costs, the faster the increase in imports tended to be. The 
fast increase of those costs denominated in euros in Portugal as compared with the EU-15 average, explains 
why, during the 1990s the volume of imports increased on an annual basis 2 percent, for each 1 percent of 
expansion in the volume of total demand.  
 
A regression aimed at explaining the growth of the volume of Portuguese exports by the increases in the real 
import demand of the EU-15 and the relative unit labour costs does not produce entirely satisfactory results. It 
shows, as it would be expected, that the behaviour of those exports depends closely on import demand in the 
EU-15, but the influence of relative unit costs seems to be weak. The regression coefficient for the last of 
those variables is negative, as it would be expected, but it is low in absolute terms (-0.17) and is significantly 
different from zero only at a 58% level of confidence.
10  
 
The reasons for the weakness of the impact of relative unit costs on the volume of exports are to be found in 
the data for the 1990s. Until 1996, Portuguese exports continued to grow very satisfactorily, despite much 
higher relative unit labour costs, because of the start of the operations of a few large export oriented projects 
(mainly in the automobile industry) financed by foreign direct investments negotiated in the late 1980s or 
early 1990s. But after 1996, there was a return to the pattern of the period 1976-80: foreign investments in 
new industrial undertakings fell to very low levels, as a result of the strong rise of the relative Portuguese unit 
labour costs since 1989; and consequently the export performance of Portugal in the period 1997-2000 was 
very disappointing – as shown in Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
9 The import regression is: M=-406.1+3.19Y+1.47L 
              (t=-12.5)  (t=27.7) (t=3.63)     R
2=0.977   F=455.1    d.f.=21 
  where : M=Index of the volume of imports of goods and services ; 
      Y=Index of real GDP; L=Index of relative unit labour costs. 
10 The export regression is: X=-69.6 + 1.68D - 0.17L 
             (t=-2.37) (t=3.40) (t=-0.55)    R
2=0.980   F= 521.6   d.f. 21  
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Table 3 
 
Export performance of Portuguese manufactured goods 
Percentage changes from previous year 
 
   
1995 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
Export performance 
 
 
3.3 
 
6.4 
 
-0.9 
 
-5.2 
 
-3.7 
 
-3.9 
 
  Export performance is calculated as the percentage change in the ratio of 
  of export volumes to export markets. 
 
  Source:  OECD Economic Outlook, numbers 58, 61, 63, 65, 67 and 69. 
 
The result of the unsatisfactory performance of exports and the rapidly increasing imports was that the deficit 
in the balance of goods and services rose progressively from 6.2 percent of GDP in 1995, to 6.6 percent in 
1996, 7.7 percent in 1997, 9.2 percent in 1998, 10.7 percent in 1998 and 12.2 percent in 2000.  This growing 
gap between imports and exports was partially covered by emigrant's remittances and transfers from the 
Structural Funds of the EU, but it required sharp increases in loans and other forms of capital inflows from 
abroad. In 2000 almost 10 percent of domestic spending in Portugal was financed by foreign borrowing and 
by portfolio or direct investments. 
 
The dramatic intensification of the dependence from foreign financing during the period 1995-2000, as a 
remedy for the losses of competitiveness, made it possible to achieve annual increases of GDP above 3 per-
cent. It is clear, however, that such a dependence can not be maintained for many years at present levels. It 
will inevitably fall in the future. The differences between the amounts of imports and exports will therefore 
have to become narrower. That result will impose strict constraints in the growth of domestic demand, unless 
there are quick improvements on external competitiveness, achieve either by rapid increases in labour 
productivity without increases of the same size in real wages or by increases in nominal wages at much lower 
rates than those of the EU-15. 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
Where : X=Index of volume of goods and services;  D=Index of the volume of total  imports of EU-15; 
L=Index of relative unit labour costs.   
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Quick improvements in labour productivity would reduce Portuguese unit labour costs in relation to the EU 
average. The problem is that steady productivity increases require structural changes (in technologies, in 
human capital, in the environment for enterprises, etc.) that can only be achieved in the medium and long run. 
Apart from cyclical fluctuations, it is not realistic to expect quick productivity improvements over a period of 
only a few years. 
 
It is also unrealistic to expect that Portuguese wages, can fall in nominal terms or that they may easily fall in 
real terms if inflation in the EMU is kept at the very low levels which the European Central Bank intends to 
maintain. In the 1980s reductions in real wages were feasible because it was possible to resort to devaluation 
and to higher than expected inflation, but those instruments are not available any more. The only feasible 
solution to increase competitiveness seems thus to be the reduction, during several years, of the Portuguese 
inflation to levels lower than the European average – a situation which is just the opposite of the experience 
of the last few years. There may be even reasons to fear that in order to recover its lost competitiveness in 
labour costs, Portugal may need a deflation. In such a case, the risks of rising unemployment would be very 
serious. Portugal had in the last twenty years an enviable unemployment record, but because of the loss of 
competitiveness of its labour costs in the 1990s, which can not be solved by exchange rate depreciations as in 
the past, the prospects for the forthcoming years are far from encouraging. 
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